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ABSTRACT
We examine the individual, contextual, and institutional determinants of faculty patenting behavior
in a panel dataset spanning the careers of 3,884 academic life scientists. Using a combination of
discrete time hazard rate models and fixed effects logistic models, we find that patenting events are
preceded by a flurry of publications, even holding constant time-invariant scientific talent and the
latent patentability of a scientist's research. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of this flurry is
influenced by context --- such as the presence of coauthors who patent and the patent stock of the
scientist's university. Whereas previous research emphasized that academic patenters are more
accomplished on average than their non-patenting counterparts, our findings suggest that patenting
behavior is also a function of scientific opportunities. This result has important implications for the
public policy debate surrounding academic patenting.
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In the past few decades, universities and other public-sector research organizations have
become more proactive in their eﬀorts to commercialize scientiﬁc discoveries (e.g., Jaﬀe and
Lerner, 2001; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). This change has
spawned a growing academic literature on university technology transfer, one stream of
which has assessed trends in university patenting and the spillover of university science into
the private sector (Jaﬀe, 1989; Mansﬁeld, 1995; Henderson et al., 1998). Underlying the
well documented upswing in university patenting has been a sharp increase in the number
of individual academic scientists who are listed as inventors on patents. In this paper, we
examine the individual, contextual, and institutional determinants of academic patenting in
a panel dataset of 3,862 academic life scientists.
Past research on academic patenting has proceeded along three distinct tracks. The
ﬁrst track has explored the inﬂuence of institutional factors, such as the prestige of the
university or the quality of its technology licensing oﬃce, on the intensity of patenting at
the university level (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003). The second track has followed a more
qualitative approach; participants in it have shown that there are important diﬀerences
in the propensity to patent across scientiﬁc and technological ﬁelds, and in the area-speciﬁc
motivations underlying patenting activity. This work has highlighted the notable diﬀerence in
the precursors to patenting between the life and physical sciences/engineering (Owen-Smith
and Powell, 2001). Researchers in the third track have focused on evaluating statistically the
consequences of patenting for the scientiﬁc output of individual academic scientists (Fabrizio
and DiMinin, 2005; Breschi et al., 2005).
Our paper shares with this last group of studies a focus on the individual scientist as
the level of analysis, but we concentrate on the antecedents — rather than the consequences
— of faculty patenting activity. We adopt this approach because we view the answer to
the question “Who Patents?” as a necessary input into the policy debate surrounding the
consequences of the academic patenting phenomenon. For example, it seems hazardous to
make policy recommendations (e.g., should patent output be taken into consideration in
hiring and promotion tenure decisions?) before gaining a clear understanding of who is
1involved in this activity, at what career stage, and at what type of institution. Furthermore,
understanding the determinants of the patenting decision provides a window into the broader
phenomenon of academic entrepreneurship, since among academic life scientists at least,
applying for a patent is a very strong and robust predictor of the decision to participate in
the founding of a start-up biotechnology ﬁrm (Stuart and Ding, 2006).
Our study generates a novel set of results, underscoring the beneﬁts of ﬁne-grained lon-
gitudinal data at the researcher level of analysis. Although we present a number of ﬁndings,
we consider two to be most signiﬁcant. First, we document that patenting is often accom-
panied by a ﬂurry of publication activity in the year preceding the patent application, even
after accounting for the lagged stock of publications (in hazard rate models) or controlling
for scientist ﬁxed eﬀects. This result highlights the fact that academic patenting, rather
than merely reﬂecting the inﬂuence of time-invariant demographic factors, also responds to
variation in scientiﬁc opportunities. Holding life-time scientiﬁc achievement constant, we
ﬁnd that surges of scientiﬁc productivity, not steady research performance, is most likely to
be associated with patenting. We interpret this as suggesting that, at the individual level,
the uncovering of new, productive areas of scientiﬁc inquiry is an important precursor to the
act of patenting.
Our second, novel ﬁnding concerns the establishment of a relationship between what
we construe to be the latent patentability of a faculty’s research and his/her propensity to
patent. While latent patentability typically has been assumed to be unobservable, we are
able to devise a patentability score for each scientist in our sample by using keywords in
the publications of scientists that have already applied for patent rights as a benchmark for
patentable research, and then comparing the research of each scientist in our dataset to this
benchmark. Although there is noise in this proxy, it nevertheless quite strongly predicts a
patenting event.
In addition to our results concerning the association between the onset of patenting and
both scientiﬁc opportunity and latent patentability, we also estimate pronounced life-cycle
eﬀects on the propensity to patent. We ﬁnd that mid-career academics are much more likely
to patent than are younger and older faculty members. Further, we provide suggestive evi-
2dence that current institutional aﬃliation and scientists’ social networks inﬂuence the onset
of patenting. In particular, two ﬁndings reveal themselves in our analyses: ﬁrst, we ﬁnd
that the presence of coauthors who have patented in the past increases the likelihood of a
patent application; second, we show that scientists are more likely to patent when they are
employed at universities with large patent portfolios. These two ﬁndings are consistent both
with the existence of genuine peer eﬀects in patenting and with the idea that the academic
labor market matches scientists with commercial proclivities in similar departments. In ad-
dition, the university-level patent eﬀect may reﬂect the role of a well-functioning technology
licensing oﬃce (TLO) in either increasing the individual-level rewards or reducing the costs
of faculty patenting.
Independent of any speciﬁc ﬁnding, the general analysis herein is relevant to the broader
question of the impact of patenting on the development of academic science. Surveys of
university faculty have found rampant concern that patenting is skewing research agendas
toward commercial priorities, causing delay in the public dissemination of research ﬁndings,
and crowding out eﬀort devoted to the pursuit of fundamental knowledge (Blumenthal et
al., 1996; Campbell et al., 2002; Krimsky, 2003). Insofar as our results relate to this issue,
the ﬁnding that patenting follows a ﬂurry of publications suggests to us that the crowd-
out hypothesis is unlikely to hold true.1 Although we cannot adjudicate between opposing
claims regarding the eﬀect of patenting on individual-level or university-level outcomes in the
present study, one can construe our results as providing the “ﬁrst stage” of an econometric
analysis of the eﬀect of academic patenting on the rate and direction of scientiﬁc progress,
an evaluation we are pursuing in other research (Azoulay et al., 2006).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we situate our contribution
in the large and growing literature on academic patenting, and highlight what we regard as
outstanding issues that can only be resolved with researcher-level longitudinal data of the
kind we analyze. Section 3 describes data sources and the construction of the sample and
1However, if scientiﬁc trajectories associated with patents exhaust themselves more quickly than those
remaining free of associations with the world of commerce, then intertemporal substitution of “basic,”
fundamental knowledge by “applied,” patentable output could still be consistent with the patterns we observe
in the data.
3discusses our econometric approach. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and reports our
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Who Patents?
In recent times, the region of overlap between the spheres of academic science and commercial
markets has experienced signiﬁcant growth. The expanding interface between these two do-
mains raises myriad questions, ranging from the amount of near-term economic value created
by the spillovers of university research, to the emergence of select universities as engines of
entrepreneurial activity, to the inﬂuence of opportunities to commercialize scientiﬁc research
on the traditional incentive systems that have governed academic science. Researchers have
engaged a variety of these questions, and advancement in our understanding is occurring
along many fronts.
Spurred in part by accessible data, many studies have assessed the role of universities
as direct sources of commercial innovations, primarily considering the quality and quantity
of their innovative outputs. For instance, Henderson et al. (1998) examine the relative
importance of university patents, ﬁnding that there has been a secular decline in the positive
quality gap separating university patents from those assigned to for-proﬁt ﬁrms. Mowery
et al. (2001) have investigated the consequence of the policy changes brought about by the
Bayh-Dole Act. They challenge the conventional wisdom that Bayh Dole has accelerated
universities’ production of patents, showing that the legislation was not a primary factor
in explaining the uptick in patenting at three prominent universities. At the level of the
university, Thursby and Thursby (2002) ﬁnd that university administrators have become
more proactive in pursuing patents and licensing opportunities. Di Gregorio and Shane
(2003) explore cross-university diﬀerences in the formation of start up companies, discovering
that intellectual eminence is a central factor distinguishing the universities that spawn start
up companies.
The majority of the archival work that has looked at the commercial outputs of universi-
ties has treated the organization as the level of analysis (notable exceptions include Agrawal
and Henderson, 2002; and Stephan et al. 2004). Two recent papers (Fabrizio and DiMinin,
42005; Breschi et al, 2005) evaluate statistically the eﬀect of academic patenting on publica-
tion output in a panel dataset of individual scientists. These authors start from a sample of
patenting academics, which they then supplement with a set of non-patenter controls. This
empirical strategy is legitimate if one focuses on the consequences of academic patenting for
other outcomes of interest, but less so if one is concerned with the antecedents of faculty
patenting activity.
In this article, we analyze the probability of patenting in a large, longitudinal, random
sample of university faculty in the life sciences. Our analysis is guided by an interest in
four issues. First, how does the proclivity to patent vary with scientists’ experience in the
profession? Second, what is the relationship between scientiﬁc productivity (measured as
papers published) and patenting? Third, are there signiﬁcant diﬀerences across research
areas within scientiﬁc disciplines in terms of the apparent “patentability” of the work, and is
there any evidence to suggest that scientists may be altering their research to move toward
patentable research? Fourth, to what extent is the propensity to patent sensitive to the
work context of the individual scientist, particularly the level of commercial orientation of a
scientist’s university and his or her coauthors?
Treating each of these in turn, we ﬁrst ask, how does the propensity to patent change over
the scientiﬁc career? Economists and sociologists alike have a long-standing interest in career
dynamics in academe, in part because incentives in science vary over the professional life
cycle. Two elements of the institutionalized reward system in science are generally thought
to be tenure-invariant: the tying of peer recognition to priority in research discovery, and the
intrinsic satisfaction garnered from solving vexing problems. However, monetary incentives
to produce research output in science do depend on the career stage, and it is well known
that the wage-tenure proﬁle in academic science is not steep (Stephan, 1996). Given the
shallow slope of post-tenure salary increases, Levin and Stephan (1991) suggest that levels
of investment in research should vary over the career life cycle. In particular, senior scientists
with tenured appointments may reallocate some of their eﬀort to consulting and other extra-
university income generating opportunities. Therefore, if the widely held assumptions about
5changing incentives over the career do in fact hold, we should observe that the rate of
patenting accelerates in the post-tenure interval.
A countervailing possibility is implied by a growing body of ethnographic research that
portrays the increasing acceptance of patenting as a legitimate activity in academic science
(Etzkowitz, 1998). If the pendulum has swung to the point that patenting is perceived to
contribute to scientists’ reputation and inﬂuence, we would expect to observe that, viewing
successive cohorts of scientists, patenting occurs with increasing frequency in the early career
stage. Consistent with this perspective, Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) describe interviews
with scientists that have come to view patents as reaﬃrmations of the originality of their
work and as contributing to their scientiﬁc visibility. Recent interview-based accounts thus
raise the possibility of a signiﬁcant shift in the norms and reward system in science, with
implications for life-cycle eﬀects in patenting.
Next, we seek to identify the relationship between scientists’ productivity and the likeli-
hood that they patent. Existing evidence suggests that the scientists with the most stellar
academic credentials are also the most likely to be involved in commercial endeavors. In
particular, Zucker et al. (1998) describe the importance of the geographic location of star
scientists in the emergence of the biotechnology industry. They argue that the direct partici-
pation of leading academic scientists in early stage biotechnology companies was so important
that the locations of star scientists served as geographical constraints on the development of
the industry.
The existing literature thus provides reason to expect that patenting is concentrated
among the group of eminent scientists. Yet, beyond the general association between research
output and the likelihood of engaging in market-related activities, identifying more precisely
the relationship between the production of papers and patents may adjudicate among the
competing mechanisms that could generate the relationship. In particular, if the magnitude
of the stock of scientists’ research output predicts the onset of patenting, it is likely that
faculty members’ scientiﬁc reputations are important considerations in the decision to patent.
If this proves to be the case, a plausible explanation is that the prominence of the inventor on
a patented technology may inﬂuence the university’s ability to capitalize on the intellectual
6property by aﬀecting the probability that potential licensees become aware of and interested
in the technology.
Consider instead the implication of a positive relationship between the ﬂow, but not
the stock, of scientists’ research output and the probability that a patent is issued. If the
ﬂow of output is the determining factor, we would suggest that technological “opportunity”
looms large in the transition to patenting. A ﬂurry of scientiﬁc output — a high ﬂow
of publications — occurs when a scientist unearths a productive domain of research. If
patenting is a byproduct of a surge in productivity, we think it reasonable to conclude that
a patent is often an opportunistic response to the discovery of a promising research area.
The third issue we consider is how the speciﬁc areas of expertise of academic scientists
aﬀect the likelihood of patenting. Obviously, there exists heterogeneity across scientists
in the potential commercial value of the research they produce. If one needs to account
for such diﬀerences, it is tempting to argue that the analyst can accommodate them by
incorporating scientist ﬁxed eﬀects in the analysis. We believe, however, that this represents
just a partial solution given the volume and the diversity of research projects that scientists
participate in throughout their careers. We therefore attempt to develop a direct measure of
the “patentability” of scientiﬁc research. The intuition behind the measure is that knowledge
of the research foci of academic scientists who have already patented can be used to identify
the domains of science in which research is patentable. With such a measure in hand, we
ask two questions. First, does the latent patentability of scientists’ research in fact aﬀect the
probability of patenting? Second, is it the patentability of the stock or the ﬂow of research
outputs that most consequentially inﬂuences the propensity to patent?
Fourth, we explore two elements of scientists’ work contexts. While it is well established
that propensities to patent vary substantially across universities, we do not have a clear
sense for the inﬂuence of organizational characteristics on the patenting rates of otherwise
similar scientists within diﬀerent universities. Numerous studies suggest that the decision
to engage in commercial activity of all sorts is strongly inﬂuenced by factors ranging from
the norms and culture of an institution vis-` a-vis commercial activity, to the quality of the
university’s technology transfer oﬃce (Thursby and Thursby 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell,
72001). Two prevalent considerations are thus the (potentially endogenous) role of a smooth
functioning technology transfer oﬃce in encouraging faculty to disclose possibly patentable
research ﬁndings, and more generally, a pro-commercialization “entrepreneurial culture” at
a university. In our analysis, we ask whether university-level variables inﬂuence the patent
rate net of controls for many observable individual-level characteristics.
A related question concerns the inﬂuence of proximate colleagues on the patent procliv-
ities of individual scientists. There are a set of reasons to expect that scientists who work
closely with commercially-inclined peers will be more likely to pursue commercial applica-
tions of their scientiﬁc research. Stuart and Ding (2006) argue that there are two mechanisms
through which colleagues aﬀect the probability that a particular scientist engages in com-
mercial activities. First, peers exert attitudinal inﬂuences, in particular shaping the degree
to which a given scientist is likely to embrace patenting as both a legitimate undertaking for
an academic scientist and as a potential contributor to his or her professional standing. Sec-
ond, peers convey information that may lower the cost of patenting, such as contacts in the
technology transfer oﬃce and advice about how to minimize the amount of time consumed
in patenting. We thus look for what might be labeled as “peer eﬀects” on the transition
to patenting. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether scientists who have co-authorship links with
patent holders, or with researchers employed in the private sector, are themselves more likely
to patent.
A necessary caveat pertains to the thorny issue of causality. Many of our independent
variables, such as publications or latent patentability, could be considered outcomes of in-
terest. Moreover, it would be incorrect to interpret our ﬁndings as providing evidence, inter
alia, that publications and patents are complements, or that latent patentability “causes”
patent applications. Rather, we have identiﬁed correlates of patenting. The conditional
correlations we estimate can still be useful insofar as they help narrow the range of plausible
theories regarding the eﬀect of academic patenting on scientiﬁc productivity. In addition,
since our most interesting results pertain to what are in fact lagged dependent variables, the
study highlights the need to use correct econometric methodologies to recover causal eﬀects.
This is pursued in a companion paper (Azoulay et al., 2006).
83 Data, Sample Characteristics, and Econometric Ap-
proach
We examine the determinants of faculty patenting behavior in a panel dataset of academic
life scientists employed at universities and non-proﬁt research institutes. This area was
chosen because the biomedical ﬁelds have accounted for the preponderance of university
patenting and licensing activity (Mowery et al., 2001). While we have not selected scientists
because they have patented, we have sampled from scientiﬁc disciplines that we know to
have signiﬁcantly contributed to a vibrant area of technological development. We began by
drawing 12,000 doctoral degree recipients from UMI Proquest Digital Dissertations, which
lists Ph.D. recipients from more than one thousand universities. In forming the sample, we
randomly selected individuals, but only those with Ph.D.s in scientiﬁc disciplines that have
informed commercial biotechnology.2 This assures a random sample of Ph.D.s in areas in
which academic research may have signiﬁcant, short-term commercial value.
Given our focus on the life sciences, one might question whether our results generalize
to other academic ﬁelds, such as mechanical or electrical engineering. One should note,
however, that our deﬁnition of life sciences is expansive. For example, our data include
scientists holding Ph.D’s in chemistry, chemical engineering, materials engineering, plant
biology, veterinary sciences, and food science. The life sciences, broadly construed, represent
such a large slice of the academic patenting phenomenon that the issue of generalizability
does not loom particularly large.3
Next, we obtained scientists’ publication records from the ISI’s Web of Science database.
Because the Web of Science includes authors’ aﬃliations, we were able to identify Ph.D.
2To identify the scientiﬁc disciplines that have been most important to biotechnology, we coded the
educational backgrounds of the Ph.D.-holding, university-employed scientiﬁc advisory board members of all
publicly traded biotechnology ﬁrms. The source of information on scientiﬁc advisors’ degrees was the IPO
prospectuses of the 533 U.S.-based biotechnology ﬁrms that have been ﬁled with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Committee. We then stratiﬁed the random draw from UMI to correspond to the disciplines and
Ph.D. grant years of ﬁrms’ scientiﬁc advisors. For example, 22 percent of biotechnology company scientiﬁc
advisors hold biochemistry Ph.D.s; we drew a corresponding proportion of biochemists into our sample.
Table 1 lists the Top 15 disciplines from which scientists in our sample are selected.
3In a related paper, one of the authors assembled a dataset of “superstar” academic patenters, which
were deﬁned to be US-based academics with more than 17 patents between 1976 and 2004 (this corresponds
to scientists above the 99th percentile of the patent count distribution). Among the 544 such scientists, he
found only 138 (25.37%) that did not ﬁt our deﬁnition of “life scientists.”
9graduates who pursued careers outside of academe. After removing individuals that (i)
had no publications in any post-graduate year, (ii) published exclusively under corporate
aﬃliations, or (iii) exited academe early in their careers,4 we were left with 3,862 scientists,
all of whom we know to have been employed at research institutions. Each scientist is
observed from the year after he or she earned a Ph.D. until 1999, unless the individual
exited academia.5 The ﬁnal panel contains 58,562 person-year observations between 1968
and 1999.
3.1 Variables
A brief description of the patenting process in academia is useful to interpret the results
we will present. The process begins when a faculty member discloses an invention to the
university’s Technology Transfer Oﬃce (TTO).6 The commercial potential of this invention
is then evaluated by the TTO, which may decide to seek patent rights on the invention.
Concurrently, the TTO will market the innovation to potential licensing partners in industry.
A typical licensing agreement speciﬁes a 40% royalty rate for the individual faculty inventor,
to be assessed on the gross licensing revenues the invention accrues.
The patents of the academic scientists in our data were assembled from the NBER patent
database (Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). To identify academic patenters, we matched
the scientists in our dataset to the list of inventors in the NBER patent database. Matches
were performed on the basis of last and ﬁrst names, and we used information on assignee
(university) and geographic region to eliminate false matches.7
4Ph.D.s with academic aﬃliations lasting less than ﬁve years were dropped from the dataset to exclude
post-doctoral fellows that later moved to jobs in industry.
5We assume a researcher has exited academia when he or she fails to publish for ﬁve consecutive years,
or when the scientist begins to publish almost exclusively under a corporate aﬃliation. In either case, we
censor observation in the year in which a scientist last publishes under a university aﬃliation.
6Faculty members are contractually obligated to disclose potentially commercializable discoveries de-
veloped on university premises to the TTO; They do not have the option to patent university-originated
discoveries without going through the oﬃcial channels. On average, TTO received 78 invention disclosures in
2003, but ﬁled only 40 new patent applications (AUTM, 2003). Of course, these numbers vary widely across
institutions depending on whether involvement with the world of commerce corresponds to a well-established
culture within the institution.
7Because we know the aﬃliations of the scientists in our data, we do not face the daunting name-matching
challenges described in Trajtenberg (2004). We are able to rule out false positives by insisting that both
scientists’ names and aﬃliations match the inventor and assignee ﬁelds in the patent data.
10Out of a population of 3,862 scientists, we found 473 (12.2%) patenters who were listed on
1,372 patents. Out of these patents, 342 were assigned to corporate entities (of which 31 were
co-assigned to a university and a corporation), even though the inventors of interest were
academically aﬃliated based on information revealed in other patent applications ﬁled by the
inventor or in publication records. Most of these corporate patents have multiple inventors
and a university scientist could be listed as one of the inventors for his advice during the
process of invention. A typical example is Richard J. Lagow, who obtained a Ph.D. in
inorganic chemistry from Rice University in 1970 and subsequently held professorships at
MIT and the University of Texas Austin. Lagow began patenting in 1973 and his patents
have been assigned to MIT, University of Texas, and Exﬂuor Research Corporation. Among
the 31 patents for which Exﬂuor is the assignee and Lagow is an inventor, 28 involved multiple
inventors and 3 listed Lagow as the sole inventor. Based on the data sources available to us, it
is not possible to determine the exact role of Lagow in developing these inventions and what
type of arrangement Lagow has with University of Texas, but from the titles and abstracts
of the Exﬂuor patents it is clear that the patented inventions are based on knowledge closely
related to Lagow’s research. Therefore, our data suggests that a non-trivial portion of faculty
patenting activity may occur without the oﬃcial involvement of their employing university’s
technology transfer oﬃce.
For each scientist in our data, we explore two dependent variables: the transition to ﬁrst
patent application and a dummy variable indicating whether the researcher applied for at
least one patent in a given year.
Research Output and Latent Patentability. We create three measures of scientists’
research output. From the Web of Science we computed annual paper publication counts for
each scientist. We count all papers on which a scientist is listed as an author.8 While this
seems a good proxy for the rate of a given scientist’s output, we would also like to measure
the content of this output. We do this in two diﬀerent ways. First, we use the aﬃliation data
available from Web of Science to identify all instances in which a scientist wrote a paper that
8In other words, we treat sole-authored and co-authored papers as equivalents, but restricting the set
of papers to those where the focal scientist appears ﬁrst or last in the authorship list generates results
substantively similar to those we present below.
11was coauthored with one or more individuals in a corporate research and development lab.
We assume that papers coauthored with researchers in industry are more likely to be of an
applied nature, and thus we consider publishing with coauthors in industry as an indicator
of the degree to which scientists are engaging in commercially-oriented research.
Second, it would be desirable to directly account for diﬀerences among scientists in the
inherent “patentability” of their research. To construct such a measure, we have used the
title words in scientists’ publications to identify the areas in which they have conducted
research, and then applied weights to theses areas based on an (endogenous-to-the-sample)
measure of the extent to which other scientists working in these areas have patented their
discoveries. Intuitively, we use the publications of scientists that have already applied for
patent rights as the benchmark for patentable research, and then compare the research of
each scientist in our dataset to this benchmark to generate a research patentability score for










where j = 1,...,J indexes each of the scientiﬁc keywords appearing in the titles of the
journal articles published by scientist i in year t,9 nijt is the number of times each of the
keywords j has appeared in scientist i’s articles published in year t, and wi
jt is a weight for
each keyword that measures the frequency with which word j is used in the titles of articles
published by scientists who have entered the patenting regime in year t or earlier, relative
to those who have not entered the patenting regime as of year t (the calculation of wi
jt is
detailed in the data appendix). Intuitively, the patentability of a scientist’s research can
change because of a change in the direction of the research of that scientist, or because other
patenters’ research increasingly comes to resemble that of the scientist. The former eﬀect is
captured by the ratio
nijt P
k nikt, the latter by the weights wi
j,t−1. Because the benchmark in year
t−1 is used to weight title words in year t, year-to-year changes in the research patentability
9We relied on title words in journal articles instead of journal- or author-assigned keywords because the
Web of Science database did not begin to include keyword descriptors until 1992. However, the titles of
biomedical research papers typically indicate the research area and the methodology used in the paper. We
ﬁnd high overlap between title words and keywords in the papers for which both are available.
12score will only reﬂect actions of the scientist (through their choices of title keywords), rather
than contemporaneous changes in the benchmark.10
Finally, to capture the idea that the inherent patentability of past research might still
inﬂuence the current propensity to patent, we compute a depreciated stock of the research
patentability score using a perpetual inventory model. Through the impact of the deprecia-
tion rate δ,11 this formulation captures the fact that the recent substantive research orienta-
tion of a scientist’s research should inﬂuence current behavior more strongly than scientiﬁc
trajectories that unfolded in the more distant past:




t−τ · FLOW RPiτ
Following a number of studies of the determinants of scientists’ productivity, we were
also able to construct many control variables to account for individual and institutional
attributes that may inﬂuence rates of publication and patenting. To account for life-cycle
eﬀects (Stephan, 1996), we include the number of years since a scientist earned his or her
Ph.D. Because the time involved in publishing scientiﬁc research varies across ﬁelds, the
regressions include a full set of dummies for researchers’ dissertation subject areas. Some
of the regressions control for time invariant quality diﬀerences among researchers through
the inclusion of scientist ﬁxed eﬀects. In speciﬁcations without ﬁxed eﬀects, we enter a
dichotomous measure of the quality of a scientists’ Ph.D.-degree granting institution — a
dummy variable indicating whether or not a scientists’ doctoral program was ranked in
the Top 20. Speciﬁcally, we collected Gourman Report rankings for all institutions in our
dataset. Gourman ranking are available at the ﬁeld level and were issued for the ﬁrst time in
1980. We assigned universities their original rating for all years prior to 1980 (and updated
them every other year for the subsequent period). In addition, we compute a count of the
10Previous researchers have developed other measures of proximity in technological space. For instance,
Jaﬀe (1986) used a cosine-based measure to assess the proximity between the R&D portfolio of any given
pair of ﬁrms. While this approach works well for measuring technological distance between dyads, it is not
well suited to our setting, since we need to measure the distance between the scientiﬁc trajectory of any
given scientist relative to that of a benchmark group of (patenting) scientists.
11We set δ equal to .15 — the Griliches constant — which has been used by many innovation researchers
on whose work this paper builds. We veriﬁed that our core results are not sensitive to this arbitrary choice.
13number of patents held by a scientist’s Ph.D.-granting university during the ﬁve years prior
to his or her degree granting year to control for any possible imprinting eﬀects.
We also include a number of employer-level variables that may inﬂuence scientists’ patent-
ing. These covariates are updated each year and when scientists change employers. First,
given the existing evidence that prominent universities are more likely to be involved in
commercial activities, we include a quality rank dummy variable analogous to the one con-
structed for Ph.D.-granting institutions. Second, we used the AUTM surveys to create a
technology transfer oﬃce (TTO) dummy variable, which is set to one in all years in which
a scientist’s employing university has an active TTO. Third, a university’s stock of patents
(excluding those of the focal scientist) is entered in the model, among other things to further
control for institutional diﬀerences in support for patenting.
Finally, to capture the patenting proclivities of our scientists’ coauthors, we measure both
the number of coauthors and whether the coauthors have applied for patents. We are able
to identify patenting behavior only for coauthors that are also members of our sample. Since
the set of scientists analyzed here are drawn randomly from the population, this limitation
should not introduce bias, although the resulting count is clearly a noisy proxy for the
underlying concept. Furthermore, to distinguish the coauthor peer eﬀect from the inﬂuence
of peers at the same institution, we exclude coauthors that are also co-workers when creating
these two variables.
3.2 Econometric Considerations
Estimating the determinants of faculty patenting behavior requires a procedure that accom-
modates the discrete nature of the event. Since our interest lies in analyzing the dynamics as-
sociated with the onset of patenting in scientiﬁc careers, we employ discrete-time hazard rate
models (Cox 1972, Myers, Hanky and Mantel 1973, Alison 1982). The use of discrete-time
models (as opposed to continuous-time models such as the Cox) is motivated by the fact that
our failure time variable displays multiple events within each time period. For a researcher i
during experience interval t, let the discrete time hazard rate be pit = Pr[Ti = t|Ti ≥ t,Xit],
where Ti is the time at which research i experiences an event and Xit a vector of covariates.





] = αt + β
0
Xit
where αt is a set of experience interval dummies. In practice, we estimate a simple logit of
the decision to apply for a patent, where the observations corresponding to years subsequent
to the ﬁrst event have been dropped from the estimation sample.
These models essentially rely on between-scientist covariate variation to identify the de-
terminants of the ﬁrst transition to patenting. A complementary approach is to consider
how within-scientist changes in covariates inﬂuence the propensity to patent. We do so by
estimating so-called “ﬁxed-eﬀects” logit models by conditional maximum likelihood (Cham-
berlain, 1984). In contrast to our implementation of the standard logits, this approach
analyzes the careers of patenting scientists in their entirety, rather than just until the year
of ﬁrst patent application. In other words, we treat patenting as a repeatable event in the
ﬁxed-eﬀects logit regressions. There is, however, a countervailing cost in the ﬁxed-eﬀects
approach, in that it drops all observations corresponding to scientists who never patent.12
We believe that, together, the discrete-time hazard models and the ﬁxed eﬀects logit models
provide a comprehensive picture of the academic patenting phenomenon.
4 Results
Among the 3,862 researchers in our sample, 473 (12.2%) hold one or more patents. In
Figure 1, we plot the distribution of patents for the patenting researchers in our sample.
The histogram illustrates a rapid drop oﬀ after one — most patenters are listed on 1 or 2
patents throughout their career, and very few scientists in our data receive more than 10
patents. Figure 2 displays the distribution of scientists’ total publication counts, broken
out by their patenting status. Consistent with the conventional wisdom that patenting is
concentrated among the group of academically productive scientists, the distribution for the
patenter subsample is much less skewed than that of the non-patenter subsample.
12Conditional maximum likelihood estimation requires some variation in the dependent variable to con-
dition out the individual scientist eﬀects. Because scientists that have never patented have no variation on
the outcome variable, they must be dropped from the analysis.
15Descriptive statistics. Table 2 presents the summary descriptive statistics for variables
used in our analysis. Table 3 reports, by scientists’ patenting status, the mean research and
employer characteristics measured at ﬁve career stages. This table shows that researchers
who have sought and received patent rights for their discoveries are more productive at each
career stage: they publish on average 35% more research papers as those who have not yet
entered the patenting regime. Scientists who have applied for patent rights are closer to
commercial research than their non-patenting counterparts, as indicated by the fact that
they have collaborated more often with researchers in the private sector. Likewise, the
intrinsic patentability of their research appears higher. Finally, patenters are more likely to
work in settings where a technology transfer oﬃce exists and patenting activity is intensive,
and they are more likely to have coauthors that have themselves patented.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of patenting events over time. Although we observe an
uptick in the years following Bayh-Dole, it is also clear that patenting activity was taking
place even before the adoption of the Act. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Mowery et
al. (2001).
Figure 4 displays, for the ﬁrst decade of scientists’ careers, the unconditional hazard of
ﬁrst patent application against experience (as measured by years since graduation) for three
distinct cohorts of scientists: those who received their Ph.D. between 1967 and 1975, those
who earned their degree between 1976 and 1985, and those who matriculated between 1986
and 1990. It is clear from Figure 4 that, over successive cohorts, the probability of patenting
in an early career stage has increased, and in the latest cohort of life scientists in our data,
it is increasing at a greater rate.13
One possible explanation for the greater incidence of patenting among early career scien-
tists is that, in recent years, post-doctoral fellows are more likely to be listed as co-inventors
on patents emanating from the research conducted in their advisors’ labs. Examining data
from the 1970s and 1980s, Stephan and Ma (2004) report that there has been an increase dur-
13The decline in the unconditional hazard for the third cohort after the ﬁfth year of experience is caused by
the gradual censoring of the patent data. Speciﬁcally, the NBER patent database contains data on patents
issued until 1999. Because our measure of patenting is dated to the time of the ﬁling of an application for a
patent that eventually issues, the ﬁnal years of our data contain fewer patenting events because we do not
observe patents that were applied for prior to 1999, but did not issue until after this year.
16ing this period both in the proportion of scientists who begin their careers as post-doctoral
fellows, and in the duration of these fellowships. We cannot explore this possibility directly
because our data neither allow us to distinguish post docs from regular faculty, nor do they
identify advisor/post-doc pairings. However, we are able to document general trends in the
incidence of patent co-inventorship.
Figure 5 presents the proportion of all ﬁrst-time patents in our data that list (i) a sole
inventor (dashed line) or (ii) list three or more inventors (solid line), plotted against the
number of years since the patenting academic scientist received his or her Ph.D. degree. The
ﬁgure demonstrates a clear negative trend in scientists’ proclivities to receive sole invented
patents over their careers, and a slightly positive trend in the incidence of multiple-inventor
patents over the career. These data alone do not permit us to ﬁrmly rule out the possi-
bility that early career patenting is somehow associated with changes in the duration and
prevalence of post-docs, but it is evidently the case that the life-cycle trend is from sole to
multiple-inventor patents, and not vice versa. As a result, we consider it likely that the
increase in slope in the early career hazard of patenting observed in Figure 4 reﬂects the fact
that, over the three decades spanned by our data, patenting has come to be recognized as a
legitimate form of scientiﬁc output in the academic life sciences.
Discrete-time hazard rate models. We now present results from the discrete-time hazard
rate regressions. The results can be found in Tables 4a and 4b. Model (1) includes the
variables often thought to be associated with academic patenting, but without the paper
count and the patentability variables. All models control for (unreported) Ph.D subject areas
and calendar year dummies. The results conﬁrm the patterns that were already apparent
in the descriptive statistics. We ﬁnd evidence that controlling for the number of coauthors,
scientists with at least one patenting coauthor are more likely to patent. We caution readers
against interpreting this correlation as evidence of patenting peer eﬀects, as it could merely
reﬂect assortative matching among scientists along some other dimension correlated with
patenting. We also ﬁnd a strong inﬂuence of co-authorship with corporate researchers on the
likelihood of ﬁrst patent application. At the mean of the other covariates, having coauthored
with researchers in industry increases the predicted probability of patenting by 25%.
17In contrast to the individual-level covariates, the impact of employer-related variables is
mixed. We fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect of the presence of a technology licensing oﬃce (this could
be due to the fact that this organizational innovation diﬀused quite rapidly among Tier-1
universities following the Bayh-Dole Act). However, we do ﬁnd an eﬀect for for the patent
stock of the current employer (but not for the intensity of patenting at the university where
the scientist earned his/her doctorate in the ﬁve years preceding the award of the degree).14
Model (2) adds two variables to the speciﬁcation: a scientist’s count of publications in
year t − 1, and a cumulative stock of publications up to year t − 2. Only the ﬂow variable
is signiﬁcant, suggesting that patenting is accompanied by a ﬂurry of scientiﬁc activity. At
the mean of the data, each additional research publication increases the researcher’s odds of
entering the patenting regime during the next year by 10%; a one standard deviation increase
(2.38) in the ﬂow of research publications is associated with a 24% increase in the likelihood
of patenting relative to the baseline rate. In Models (3) and (4), we explore further the timing
of this ﬂurry by using more ﬂexible speciﬁcations for the distributed lag of publications. In
Model (3), we include the ﬂow of publications in year t−2 and the stock up to year t−3. In
Model (4), we include the ﬂow of publications in year t−3 and the stock up to year t−4. In
both cases, only the coeﬃcient for the one-year lagged variable is signiﬁcant; in other words,
Model (2) appears to capture accurately the timing of the publication ﬂurry associated with
patenting.
This conditional correlation strikes us as being an important ﬁnding, for it can help dis-
tinguish between competing interpretations of the association between scientiﬁc productivity
and involvement with the world of commerce. In the ﬁrst interpretation, commercialization
activities correspond to attempts by academics to monetize established reputations and pro-
fessional status. In the second interpretation, publications and patents are co-occurring
outputs that encode the same set of scientiﬁc insights; patents, just like publications, re-
ﬂect genuine shocks to scientiﬁc opportunities. We see the correlation between the onset of
14In Table 4, the hazard of patenting appears to be monotonically decreasing in experience. However, this
trend merely reﬂects our decision to limit the analysis to the ﬁrst patenting event. Because we drop scientists
from the data once they have patented, we would expect to observe negative duration dependence as only
those scientists that have not yet patented prior to an experience interval remain in the risk set during that
interval. In other words, the scientists that remain in the risk set to inform the coeﬃcient estimates for the
later experience intervals are predominantly non-patenters.
18patenting and the lagged ﬂow, but not the stock, of publications as much more consistent
with the latter interpretation.15 The plausibility of this interpretation is reinforced by a
peculiar aspect of US patent law, which grants inventors a one-year grace period from the
date of publication for the ﬁling of a patent application (Merges, 1997, p. 226). In other
words, an academic inventor wishing to maximize the eﬀective life of a patent would apply
to the USPTO exactly 364 days after the date of publication, provided that he/she is willing
to forego patent protection in foreign jurisdictions.
Using the speciﬁcation in Model (2) as a benchmark, Table 4b examines the inﬂuence of
the latent patentability of the scientist’s research on his/her propensity to enter the patenting
regime. We proceed with the analysis parallel to the approach taken in Table 4a. Model (5)
adds the ﬂow of our research patentability score in year t−1 (i.e., based on our endogenous-to-
the-sample measure, the extent to which the papers a scientist has published in the previous
year are substantively similar to the work previously published by patenting scientists) and
the corresponding cumulative stock up to year t − 2. Here again, we ﬁnd that only the ﬂow
inﬂuences the likelihood of patenting. At the mean of the data, increasing the patentability
score by one standard deviation increases the likelihood of ﬁrst patent application by 6%.
Moreover, as can be seen in Models (6) through (8), the conclusion is not substantially
altered when using a more ﬂexible functional form to model the distributed lag of the latent
patentability score.16 Just as in the case of publications, the onset of patenting appears
simultaneous with a change in the content of a scientist’s research in a direction that makes
it more similar to that of scientists who have already applied for patent rights. But because it
is the ﬂow, and not the stock of this measure that seems to matter, the evidence is consistent
with the idea that a patent application does not constitute merely a response to changes in
the formal and informal incentives faced by academic scientists over their careers, but also
reﬂects the seizing of opportunities along a novel research trajectory.
15This interpretation is also consistent with Murray and Stern’s (2005) analysis of paper-patent pairs,
but it suggests that this phenomenon is not conﬁned to the single journal whose articles they analyze. Of
course, since we do not examine the actual content of patents and papers, we can only provide circumstantial
evidence in favor of a substantive linkage between these two forms of output. In practice, it seems likely that
patentable claims will be spread over a number of papers revolving around a common theme, some published
before, some after the ﬁling of the patent application.
16Speciﬁcally, in Model (8), we replace the research patentability ﬂow at t−1 with a dummy for observations
that lie above the 75th percentile of the research patentability ﬂow variable.
19Using Model (8) as the benchmark, Model (9) examines whether the pre-application
ﬂurry of publications observed in Table 4a varies in magnitude over the life cycle. We ﬁnd
no evidence of a ﬂurry during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the experience clock. For life scientists,
this period typically corresponds to postdoctoral fellowships, before obtaining a ﬁrst job as
an established, independent investigator. In subsequent years, the magnitude of the ﬂurry
is in fact quite stable.
In summary, we ﬁnd that individual rates of patenting respond to scientiﬁc opportunities,
and that patenting coincides with a genuine change in the content of these scientists’ research.
In contrast, our individual-level analyses suggest at best weak institutional inﬂuences on
scientists’ propensity to patent. Studies using university-level data have typically found
strong institutional and contextual eﬀects (e.g., Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Foltz et al.,
2003). This discrepancy might be due to the sorting role of the academic labor market. Even
in the absence of true “imprinting eﬀects,” scientists with commercial proclivities could
match with universities providing a commercialization-friendly environment. This would
mechanically lead to a correlation between organizational patenting rates and university
characteristics.
Fixed-eﬀects logit models. The results presented above suﬀer from two limitations. First,
they only pertain to the decision to apply for the ﬁrst patent. For a sizable proportion of
scientists, patenting is a repeated event, and the determinants of patenting could diﬀer in the
group of serial patenters. Moreover, one might object that our result regarding the ﬂurry of
publications contemporaneous with patenting assumes that the lagged stock of publications
adequately captures diﬀerences in talent among scientists. It would be desirable to subject
this set of results to a more stringent test. For these reasons, Tables 5a and 5b replicate
models (1) through (8) in tables 4a and 4b using ﬁxed-eﬀects logit models. In these models,
patenting is treated as a repeated event, and there are as many observations in the estimation
sample as there are person-years for patenting scientists.17
Table 5a shows that the impact of the one-year lagged count of publications remains
even after accounting for time-invariant talent diﬀerences among scientists through ﬁxed
17We also drop the stock variables from the speciﬁcations, since they move too slowly to be separately
identiﬁed from the individual eﬀects.
20individual eﬀects, and that the inclusion of additional lags does not modify the result. We
interpret this ﬁnding as suggesting that within-scientist changes in scientiﬁc opportunities
inﬂuence their likelihood of patenting.
Similarly, Table 5b highlights the role of changes in the latent patentability of a scientist’s
research, which again appear to correlate with patenting events. Models (5) through (7)
experiment with diﬀerent lag speciﬁcations. As in the case of the discrete hazard models,
we ﬁnd an eﬀect only in the year immediately preceding the year of patent application. In
Model (8), we summarize the patentability measure with a dummy variable set to one for
observations above the 75th percentile of the continuous RP variable, which yields similar
results. The statistical signiﬁcance of these eﬀects is weaker than in the corresponding “cross-
sectional” hazard rate models. This is not surprising, since the choice of research topic by
individual scientists is likely to exhibit stickiness.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The policy debate regarding interactions between industry and academia in general, and aca-
demic patenting in particular, has often taken for granted the idea that patenting represents
a fundamental departure from the norms of the “Republic of Science.” According to this
view, academic researchers toil in relative obscurity by producing fundamental knowledge
up until the time they receive tenure; subsequently, they may monetize their reputation by
involving themselves in commercial pursuits. Patents, though not necessarily remunerative
in and of themselves, provide academic researchers with visibility and status in the world
of commerce, for example by contributing to the likelihood that they are invited to sit on
corporate advisory boards (Stuart and Ding, 2006).
The ﬁndings in this paper challenge the standard account. First and foremost, our
results suggest that patents and publications correspond to two types of output that have
more in common than previously believed. Indeed, the positive relationship between patent
applications and the ﬂow, but not the stock, of publications suggest that patents and papers
encode similar pieces of knowledge, a fact exploited by Murray and Stern (2005) in their
investigation of the anti-commons hypothesis. Second, our results suggest that the academic
21incentive system may be evolving in ways that accommodate deviations from traditional
scientiﬁc norms of openness. Many patenting events in our data take place in the early
years of scientists’ careers, and the slope of the patent-experience curve has become steeper
with more recent cohorts of scientists. This ﬁnding dovetails with qualitative accounts that
emphasize that patents are becoming de rigueur on academic vitas in many institutions, and
are even considered legitimate forms of research output in promotion decisions.
If the present paper investigates the antecedents of academic patenting, much work re-
mains to be done on the eﬀects of this now-prevalent practice on the rate of scientiﬁc progress.
Does applied research (as embodied in patents) crowd out the fundamental pursuit of knowl-
edge (as measured by publications)? Answering this question is diﬃcult, because patenting
is a choice variable for scientists, and the outcome of a decision that could easily reﬂect ex-
pectations of future scientiﬁc productivity. Our paper provides an important input into this
analysis by presenting the results of a selection equation whose estimation is necessary to
recover causal eﬀects of patenting on scientiﬁc output (Azoulay et al., 2006). But our results
also alert us to the possibility that the substantive content of post-patent publications might
be diﬀerent from these scientists’ pre-patent output, leading naturally to the study of the
eﬀect of patenting on the direction of scientiﬁc progress. Our measure of latent patentability,
whose construction is an important contribution of this paper, can be used on the left-hand
side of a regression equation to investigate this important question.
Finally, our ﬁndings suggest that social contagion might be an important mechanism
through which the practice of academic patenting diﬀuses among the population of life sci-
entists. The result that scientists whose coauthors patent are more likely to patent themselves
is consistent with genuine “peer eﬀects,” but it is also consistent with assortative matching
of coauthors along some other dimension correlated with patenting — such as scientiﬁc pro-
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Top 15 Scientific Disciplines in the Sample 
UMI Subject  
Code  UMI Subject Description  Frequency 
487; 303  Biochemistry  855  (22.2%) 
306 Biology,  General  563  (14.6%) 
410 Biology,  Microbiology  466  (12.1%) 
419  Health Sciences, Pharmacology 239  (6.2%) 
490 Chemistry,  Organic  212  (5.5%) 
786 Biophysics,  General  210  (5.4%) 
369 Biology,  Genetics  191  (4.9%) 
433  Biology, Animal Physiology  170  (4.4%) 
982  Health Sciences, Immunology  167  (4.3%) 
307 Biology,  Molecular  102  (2.6%) 
301 Bacteriology  61  (1.6%) 
287 Biology,  Anatomy  54  (1.4%) 
571  Health Sciences, Pathology  52  (1.3%) 
349 Psychology,  psychobiology 37  (1.0%) 
572  Health Sciences, Pharmacy  34  (0.9%) 
Legend: Table 1 reports the Top 15 disciplines from which our sample was 
drawn. These disciplines have spawned the greatest number of biotechnology 
firm founders, scientific advisors and executives. The table also reports the 
frequency and the proportion of scientists in our sample for each of these 15 
scientific disciplines. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Time-varying (58,562 person-year observations) 
Experience  10.201 7.122  1  32 
Patent flow dummy  0.017 0.131  0  1 
Patent regime dummy  0.073 0.261  0  1 
Publications flow  1.729 2.379  0  35 
Publications stock  17.563 26.759  0  386 
Research patentability flow  0.022 0.049  0  4.173 
Research patentability stock  0.111 0.142  0  4.201 
Collaboration tie with company scientists  0.235 0.424  0  1 
Average number of identified coauthors per paper 0.122 0.244  0  10 
Identified coauthors have patents  0.039 0.193  0  1 
Employer graduate school in Top 20  0.231 0.422  0  1 
Employer has TTO  0.488 0.500  0  1 
Employer patent stock  71.80 145.18  0  2,189 
Calendar year  1986 7.741  1968  1999 
Time-invariant (3,862 observations) 
Ph.D. univ. grad. school in Top 20  0.308 0.462  0  1 
Ph.D. univ. 5-year patent stock  18.983 40.906  0  566 
Scientist has one or more patents  0.122 0.328  0  1 
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Table 3 
Scientists’ Mean Research and Employer Characteristics 
at Five Career Stages by Patent Application Status 
  Experience = 5 Experience = 10 Experience = 15 Experience = 20 Experience = 25
Scientist has at least one patent application  Yes No  Yes No    Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 



































































































































































































Observations  96  3,610  166 2,429    216 1,621  228 1072  114  519 






th year after the scientist was granted a Ph.D. Within each career stage, the table is further broken out by whether a scientist has ever applied 
for a patent right (e.g., if a scientist applied for a patent right during the 20
th year after he was granted a Ph.D., he contributed to the mean values of 
the “no” category of experience = 5, 10 and 15, and to the mean values of the “yes” category of experience = 20 and 25).  29
Table 4a 
Discrete-Time Hazard Models of Probability of Patenting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.143 0.198 0.234 0.207
Experience [1, 4] 
(0.271) (0.276) (0.278) (0.276) 
0.346 0.376 0.421 0.375 
Experience [5, 8] 
(0.244) (0.249) (0.252)
† (0.251) 
0.589 0.585 0.624 0.584 






0.595 0.581 0.603 0.582 






0.224 0.070 0.080 0.072 
Collaboration tie with company scientistst-1 
(0.107)
*  (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
0.445 0.433 0.426 0.434 





0.547 0.355 0.364 0.355 






0.089 0.075 0.076 0.075 
Ph.D. University Grad School in Top 20  
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Ph.D. University 5-year Patent Stock 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.014 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 
Employer Grad School in Top 20 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
0.047 0.019 0.019 0.018 
Employer has a TTOt-1 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
0.081 0.080 0.079 0.079 






 -0.001    
Research Publication Stockt-2 
 (0.002)    
  0.001   
Research Publication Stockt-3 
  ( 0 . 0 0 3 )    
   -0.001 
Research Publication Stockt-4 
   (0.003) 
  0.096 0.107 0.100 





  -0.029  -0.039 
Research Publication Flowt-2 
  (0.027)  (0.028) 
   0.035 
Research Publication Flowt-3 
   (0.027) 







Log-likelihood  -2576.20 -2560.69 -2559.50 -2558.69
Wald Chi
2  291.86 333.71 336.35 339.64 
Model d.f.  43 45 46 47 
Pseudo-R
2  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06   30
Table 4b 
Discrete-Time Hazard Models of Probability of Patenting 
  (5)  (6) (7)   (8)  (9)
0.259 0.253 0.277 0.240 0.426 Experience [1, 4] 
(0.278) (0.278) (0.281)  (0.279)  (0.326)
0.404 0.376 0.369 0.394 0.434 Experience [5, 8] 
(0.250) (0.250) (0.249)  (0.250)  (0.310)














0.057 0.049 0.042 0.054 0.059 Collaboration tie with company scientistst-1 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113)  (0.114)  (0.114)







0.316 0.317 0.318 0.303 0.301 Identified Coauthors have patent t-1 
(0.205) (0.205) (0.205)  (0.206)  (0.207)
0.075 0.073 0.071 0.073 0.073 Ph.D. University Grad School in Top 20  
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.104)
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 Ph.D. University 5-year Patent Stock 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
-0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 -0.029 Employer Grad School in Top 20 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.120)
0.012 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.015 Employer has a TTOt-1 
(0.118) (0.119) (0.119)  (0.118)  (0.119)
0.082 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.084







-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 Research Publication Stockt-2 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)






0.447 0.405 0.404 Research Patentability Stockt-2 
(0.285) (0.298)  (0.298)
0.158   Research Patentability Stockt-3 
(0.323)  
0.141   Research Patentability Stockt-4 
(0.339)  




*   
1.246 1.286   Research Patentability Flowt-2 
(0.715)
† (0.713)
†   
-0.134   Research Patentability Flowt-3 
(0.974)  




 0.010 Publication Flowt-1× Experience [1,4] 
  (0.028)
 0.114 Publication Flowt-1× Experience [5,8] 
  (0.034)
**
 0.064 Publication Flowt-1× Experience [9,15] 
  (0.032)
*
 0.079 Publication Flowt-1× Experience [16,22] 
  (0.036)
*
 0.113 Publication Flowt-1× Experience [23,29] 
  (0.055)
*







Log-likelihood  -2557.28 -2556.28 -2555.94 -2555.27 -2554.70
Wald Chi
2  338.39 338.98 339.22 345.91 350.80
Model d.f.  48 50 52 47 51
Pseudo-R
2  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06  31
Notes: 
(1) Number of observations = 54,737; number of researchers = 3,862; number of first patenting events = 473. 
(2) For all researchers in the sample, only observations on or before the year of the first patenting event or censoring 
have been used, i.e., for all researchers that have patented, the observations after the year of their first patent 
application were not used in the analysis. 
(3) All models control for Ph.D. subject areas and calendar year dummies. 
(4) Experience [23, 29] is the base category. 
(5) A dummy variable indicating whether the researcher has zero publication in year t-1 is included in models (5)-(7), 
though not reported in the table; a dummy variable indicating whether the researcher has zero publication in year t-2 
is included in models (6) and (7), though not reported in the table; a dummy variable indicating whether the 
researcher has zero publication in year t-3 is included in model (7), though not reported in the table. 
(6) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scientist. 
(7) 
†significant at 10%; 
*significant at 5%; 
**significant at 1%.     32
Table 5a 
Fixed-Effect Logit Models of Probability of Patenting 
   (1)  (2)   (3)     (4)
0.060 0.053 0.053 0.053 
Experience [1, 4] 
(0.446) (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) 
0.315 0.295 0.295 0.295 
Experience [5, 8] 
(0.374) (0.374) (0.374) (0.374) 
0.561 0.523 0.524 0.524 






0.535 0.499 0.500 0.500 






-0.106 -0.123 -0.120 -0.120 
Collaboration tie with company scientistst-1 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135) 
0.323 0.305 0.304 0.303 
Average number of identified coauthors per paper t-1 (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.198) 
0.430 0.390 0.392 0.392 






-0.195 -0.174 -0.175 -0.175 
Employer Grad School in Top 20 
(0.205) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) 
0.355 0.359 0.358 0.358 






0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 
Employer Patent Stockt-1 × 100 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
  0.033 0.034 0.034 





  -0.003 -0.003 
Research Publication Flowt-2 
  (0.017)  (0.018) 
   -0.0001 
Research Publication Flowt-3 
   (0.018) 
Log-likelihood  -2016.65 -2014.38 -2014.37 -2014.37 
Wald Chi
2  580.56 585.09 585.11 585.11 
Model d.f.  19 20 21 22 
Pseudo-R
2  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13   33
Table 5b 
Fixed-Effect Logit Models of Probability of Patenting 
  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)
0.061 0.061 0.032 0.061 
Experience [1, 4] 
(0.446) (0.446) (0.448) (0.446) 
0.295 0.289 0.278 0.296 
Experience [5, 8] 
(0.374) (0.375) (0.376) (0.374) 
0.521 0.516 0.513 0.523 






0.495 0.492 0.490 0.499 






-0.123 -0.125 -0.121 -0.124 
Collaboration tie with company scientistst-1 
(0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
0.299 0.295 0.291 0.309 
Average number of identified coauthors per paper t-1 
(0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.197) 
0.370 0.371 0.379 0.371 






-0.177 -0.176 -0.179 -0.173 
Employer Grad School in Top 20 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) 
0.358 0.357 0.355 0.361 






0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 
Employer Patent Stockt-1 × 100 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
0.030 0.029 0.030 0.032 






2.207 2.206 2.138  





  -0.207 -0.164  
Research Patentability Flowt-2 
  (1.014) (1.021)  
  -0.949   
Research Patentability Flowt-3 
  ( 1 . 1 6 0 )    
   0.199 
High Research Patentability Flowt-1 
   ( 0 . 1 1 3 )
† 
Log-likelihood -2012.45  -2012.40 -2011.87 -2012.87 
Wald Chi
2  588.96 589.05 590.12 588.11 
Model  df  22 24 26 21 
Pseudo-R
2  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Notes: 
(1) Number of observations = 9,312; number of researchers = 473. 
(2) All models control for period dummies 1975-76, 1977-79, 1980-82, 1983-85, 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94, 1995-97, 
1998-99; base category is 1967-74. 
(3) Experience [23, 29] is the base category. 
(4) A dummy variable indicating whether the researcher has zero publication in year t-1 is included in models 5-7, 
though not reported in the table; a dummy variable indicating whether the researcher has zero publication in year 
t-2 is included in models 6 and 7, though not reported in the table; a dummy variable indicating whether the 
researcher has zero publication in year t-3 is included in model 7, though not reported in the table. 
(5) 
† significant at 10%; 
* significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.   34
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Figure 3: 

























































































Number of Patent Applications
Proportion of Patenting Scientists
 
Legend: Figure 3 plots the number of patent applications filed in each year and the 












2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Experience (years since Ph.D. degree grant)
Ph.D. granted in 1967-1975 Ph.D. granted in 1976-1985
Ph.D. granted in 1986-1990
 
Legend: Figure 4 plots the kernel-smoothed estimate of the unconditional 
hazard of first patent application for three cohorts of scientists. 
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Experience (Years after Ph.D. Grant)
Solo inventor 3 or more inventors
 
Legend: A “solo” inventor patent is one that lists a single inventor. A “3 or more 
inventor” patent is one that lists at least three inventors. Proportions represent 
the percent of all first-time patents applied for by academic scientists in a given 
post-Ph.D. experience year that belong to either of these two categories. 
 Data Appendix: Keyword Weights
wi












where msjt denotes the number of times keyword j has appeared in articles published up to year t
by scientist s, I
p
t is the subset of scientists in our sample that have already applied for one or more
patents as of year t, and I
np
t is the subset of scientists in our sample that have not yet applied for
any patent as of year t. The weight is also indexed by scientist i, because i’s publications are taken
out of the set of articles used to compute the formula above.
To create the numerator of wi
jt, we ﬁrst create a row-normalized matrix with each scientist in the
patenting regime listed in a row and each of the keywords used to describe their papers up to year
t listed in a column. The sjth cell in the matrix, [msjt/
P
k mskt], corresponds to the proportion of
title keywords for scientist s that corresponds to keyword j. We then take the column sums from
this matrix, i.e., we sum the contributions of individual patenting scientists for keyword j. Turning
next to the denominator, we proceed in a similar manner, except that the articles considered only
belong to the set of scientists who have not applied for patents as of year t. The numerator is then
deﬂated by the frequency of use for j by non-patenters (in the rare case of keywords exclusively
used by patenters, we substitute the number 1 for the frequency).
The weights wi
jt are large for keywords that have appeared with disproportionate frequency as
descriptors of papers written by scientists already in the patenting regime, relative to scientists not
yet in the patenting regime.
Two things should be noted about the construction of these weights. First, wi
jt = 0 for all
keywords that have never appeared in the titles of papers written by scientists that have patented
before t. Second, the articles written by scientist i him/herself do not contribute at all to the
weights wi
jt. Therefore, no scientist can directly inﬂuence year-to-year changes in these weights.
The ﬁnal step for each scientist i in the dataset is to produce a list of the keywords in the
individual’s papers published in year t, calculate the proportion of the total represented by each
keyword j, apply the appropriate keyword weight wi
j,t−1, and sum over keywords to produce a
composite score. The resulting variable increases in the degree to which keywords in the titles of
a focal scientist’s papers have appeared relatively more frequently in the titles of other academics
who have applied for patents. This score is entered in the regressions to control for the research
patentability of scientists’ areas of specialization.
To illustrate the construction of the research patentability measure, Table A1 lists some repre-
sentative keywords, along with their patentability weights in the year 2000. Consider the keyword
“ubiquitin” (italicized in the table) in group 1. In 1999, it had previously appeared 55 times as a
keyword in one or more articles of scientists who had patented prior to 1999. Among them is Keith
D. Wilkinson, professor of biochemistry at Emory University School of Medicine, who is listed as
an inventor on a patent ﬁled in 1992. To compute the numerator of the patentability weight for
this keyword, we begin with the fraction of Wilkinson’s research using “ubiquitin” in the title. In
his 43 ISI-listed research papers published between 1977 (when he was granted a Ph.D.) and 1999,
133 unique keywords have been used a total of 330 times. The word “ubiquitin” was used 24 times,
hence the fraction of Wilkinson’s research stock devoted to “ubiqutin” is 0.073. This procedure is
37repeated for the other eight patenting scientists who have used the word. The sum of these frac-
tions taken over all patenting scientists is reported in column (2) of the table. Next, to compute
the denominator in the above equation, we examine the keywords of all scientists who had not yet
received a patent by 1999 for the appearance of the word ubiquitin. In the research publications
of 3,854 such scientists, this keyword has appeared on 30 occasions. The patentability weight for
each keyword is obtained by dividing the sum of proportions of keyword use by patenting scientists
(column 2) by the count of the use of the keyword by non-patenting scientists (column 3).
38  39
Table A1: Sample Title Keywords in the year 1999 







Sum over all 
patenting scientists 
of keyword’s 













Group 1   
HIV-inhibitory 24  0.011  1  1.100 
Ribozyme 32  0.074  15  0.493 
Ubiquitin  55 0.145 30  0.483 
Glycosylase 22  0.037  10  0.370 
Aldose 36  0.059  16  0.369 
Vitronectin 23  0.076  23  0.330 
Glaucoma 30  0.069  25  0.276 
Telomere 37  0.094  35  0.269 
Melatonin 40  0.114  44  0.259 
Lymphokine-activated 83  0.084  33  0.255 
Spirochete 24  0.039  16  0.244 
Coronavirus 28  0.066  28  0.236 
Dendritic 43  0.178  83  0.214 
E1A 37  0.066  32  0.206 
Pheromone 66  0.119  58  0.205 
Group 2       
Receptor 1161  2.270  4134  0.055 
Antigen 494  1.094  1789  0.061 
Antibody 425  1.043  1587  0.066 
T-Cell 424  0.900  1242  0.072 
Peptide 403  1.098  1511  0.073 
Group 3       
Carnitine 1  0.0004  60  0.0007 
Aromatase 1  0.0006 70  0.0009 
Adenovirus-mediated 1  0.0004  37 0.001 
Bismuth 1  0.0003  33  0.001 
Endothelium-dependent 1  0.0007  51  0.001 
Legend: To illustrate the construction of keyword weights, we have chosen representative words in three categories. Group 1 
keywords are typical of those that appear frequently in the work of patenting scientists, and infrequently in the work of non-
patenting scientists. These words receive high patentability weights. Group 2 comprises keywords that occur frequently in the 
journal articles of both patenting and non-patenting scientists. Words in this group garner intermediate weights. Group 3 
contains keywords that are very common in the research of non-patenting scientists but uncommon in the work of patenters. In 
consequence, these keywords receive low weight. 
 